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List: websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
From: Mike
 
Re: [WEB SECURITY] a new 'Secret Key' Cryptographic Algorithm ~ any analysis/suggestions/weakness will be helpful ~ Variation of One-Time Pad
Wed, Apr 27, 2011 4:49 AM
. ________________________________ From: Abhishek [ABK] Kumar To: Mike Cc: Michal Zalewski ; "websecurity@webappsec.org" Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 9:25 PM Subject: Re: [WEB SECURITY] a new 'Secret Key' Cryptographic Algorithm ~ any analysis/suggestions
List: tacoma-environews@list.cityoftacoma.org
From: Marianne Seifert
 
PC EH Trends forum May 31 - Toxics in the Marine Food Web
Wed, May 9, 2012 11:12 PM
Pierce County Environmental Health Trends Forum May 31, 6-8 pm Topic: Toxics in the Marine Food Web Speakers: Jim West and Heather Trim Location: Evergreen State College Tacoma Campus Draft agenda at www.tpchd.org/ehindicators Please forward - all are welcome!
List: time-nuts@lists.febo.com
From: Edgardo Molina
 
Re: [time-nuts] HP-53132A Faded and flickering display
Wed, Nov 14, 2012 3:37 AM
The generic part number is >> CP3033A, but it does not show up in their product line on their web >> site.
List: volt-nuts@lists.febo.com
From: Rob Klein
 
Re: [volt-nuts] LTZ1000ACH and LTZ1000CH in China
Sat, Aug 27, 2011 1:23 PM
hl=nl&sl=zh-CN&tl=en&u=http://www.eefocus.com/lymexbg2vo/blog en&u=http://www.eefocus.com/lymexbg2vo/blog> Rob.
List: time-nuts@lists.febo.com
From: Randy Warner
 
Re: [time-nuts] Signav GPS timing receivers
Tue, Jan 2, 2007 6:33 PM
Cheers, Magnus _______________________________________________ time-nuts mailing list time-nuts@febo.com https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
List: birdalert@ontbirds.ca
From: Mike V.A. Burrell
 
Re: [ONTBIRDS] Swallow-tailed Kite near Luther Marsh (Dufferin County)
Wed, Aug 5, 2020 1:25 PM
Roughly here: > https://goo.gl/maps/sfAQBEG8xCvYToUP9 > > Please post an update if the bird is currently being seen or not. > > Yesterday's report: https://ebird.org/checklist/S72027585 > Today's (August 2) report with photo: > https://ebird.org/checklist/S72050200 > > Swallow-tailed Kite is on the review list for Ontario and anyone who > observes it is encouraged
List: usrp-users@lists.ettus.com
From: Ali Dormiani
 
Re: [USRP-users] thunderbolt to sfp+
Wed, Feb 6, 2019 6:35 PM
On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 10:10 AM Rob Kossler via USRP-users < usrp-users@lists.ettus.com> wrote: > I am interested in purchasing a Thunderbolt to SFP adapter and I found > this QNAP QNA-T310G1S <https://www.qnap.com/en-us/product/qna-tb-10gbe> available > from B&H for $169 > <https://www.bhphotovideo.com/c/product/1452479-REG/qnap_qna_t310g1s_single_port_thunderbolt3
List: tacoma-environews@list.cityoftacoma.org
From: Green Drinks
 
July Green Drinks - Get your tickets now!
Fri, Jun 5, 2026 3:36 PM
Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=86050006565&fref=ts> or Instagram <https://www.instagram.com/greendrinks253/?hl=en>!
List: tacomaart@list.cityoftacoma.org
From: chelsia.design (at) gmail.com
 
Invitation: SOULstice Art Application DL @ Tue May 21, 2019 (tacomaart@list.cityoftacoma.org)
Tue, Apr 16, 2019 8:54 PM
Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding
List: websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
From: Paul Johnston
 
Re: [WEB SECURITY] Wanted: HTML5 Web Security Researcher
Sun, Nov 11, 2012 12:02 AM
milar access, then net impact is 0. If pre-CORS* the sites were not > explicitly defining any privileges, then the sites were governed by > same-origin and therefore the net impact is risk increasing. The article mentions that with a wildcard, a request can be sent with cookies, but JavaScript can't read the response. I think we only need to really worry about requests with cookies - without this (and knowing the URL) the attacker could just make that request themselves directly (although this may be a way to bypass IP based restrictions). The status quo, is that you can send such a request anyway, using something like an image tag or a form target - but the cross origin model prevents reading the response. So I think the risk for these sites is quite minor. Probably biggest risk is that some clients may incorrectly implement CORS, and having this header exposes you to related bugs. > 20% of sites using CORS explicitly define a single origin (presumably their > own). If these sites were susceptible to XSS pre-CORS (a good assumption) > then the impact is risk reducing. If the sites were not susceptible to XSS > then the impact is 0. If the site is susceptible to XSS without CORS, then I don't think having a CORS header greatly reduces the risk. For a simple XSS, like getting a user to click a link to http://vuln/vuln?id= - CORS will make no difference. I think CORS is not intended as a security mechanism, more as new functionality to allow cross-domain requests. It seems to me to be designed to do this reasonably securely - although looking for implementation bugs would be interesting. There is the more general trust issue of allowing an external site to access response bodies with cookies, but that's not greatly different to existing trust issues around JSONP and