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Re: [time-nuts] The Demise of LORAN (was Re: Reference oscillator accuracy)

DI
David I. Emery
Mon, Nov 16, 2009 1:21 AM

On Sun, Nov 15, 2009 at 07:41:35PM -0500, Mike Monett wrote:

One can clearly divide the targets into soft ones (GPS timing,

AVR systems, some civilian aircraft nav, civilian vehicle nav etc) and
some very hard ones (multiple frequency steered beam antenna military
P/Y keyed systems which can take advantage of all the known tricks).

Presumably there is now quite a bit of experience in the

military with jamming their jam resistant systems (or trying to and
failing) and presumably they have some well thought out strategies for
neutralizing it or its impact... for them.

However, there are many SOFT users who actually depend on GPS 

more than they realize who have gear that can be knocked out by weak
jamming (as illustrated by interference cases from innocent sources like
malfunctioning antenna preamps) very easily.  Not clear to me what the
effects of doing so  over a wide area might be now or especially in 5-10
years from now when more and  more stuff depends on GPS timing or
location or frequency or all three.

Civilian gear does not in general worry about jamming...  and

its operators rarely have the training or access to the reason it may
not be functioning to know that jamming is happening.  This is
especially true of spoof jamming that attempts to create false timing or
position as opposed to jamming that just causes an effective no GPS
condition.

John is right, that jamming that knocks out service or causes to

be wrong intermittently would be just as effective in many cases as
steady blanket jamming... especially if there is little expectation that
this might be a threat. (Clearly the military has considered all this
carefully, but not necessarily for the civilian uses they may not even
know about).

And while restoring a destroyed Loran C site might take a while,

launching a new GPS satellite to replace one destroyed by some natural
event (solar outbursts) or some man made event (clouds of debris - either
deliberate or accidental) takes MUCH longer and cannot be hurried up much.
I doubt many flight ready spares are kept around (including rocket and
all the rest) and even if there are one or two a major event could take
out more than that number if it is at all global in impact.

--
Dave Emery N1PRE/AE, die@dieconsulting.com  DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493
"An empty zombie mind with a forlorn barely readable weatherbeaten
'For Rent' sign still vainly flapping outside on the weed encrusted pole - in
celebration of what could have been, but wasn't and is not to be now either."

On Sun, Nov 15, 2009 at 07:41:35PM -0500, Mike Monett wrote: One can clearly divide the targets into soft ones (GPS timing, AVR systems, some civilian aircraft nav, civilian vehicle nav etc) and some very hard ones (multiple frequency steered beam antenna military P/Y keyed systems which can take advantage of all the known tricks). Presumably there is now quite a bit of experience in the military with jamming their jam resistant systems (or trying to and failing) and presumably they have some well thought out strategies for neutralizing it or its impact... for them. However, there are many SOFT users who actually depend on GPS more than they realize who have gear that can be knocked out by weak jamming (as illustrated by interference cases from innocent sources like malfunctioning antenna preamps) very easily. Not clear to me what the effects of doing so over a wide area might be now or especially in 5-10 years from now when more and more stuff depends on GPS timing or location or frequency or all three. Civilian gear does not in general worry about jamming... and its operators rarely have the training or access to the reason it may not be functioning to know that jamming is happening. This is especially true of spoof jamming that attempts to create false timing or position as opposed to jamming that just causes an effective no GPS condition. John is right, that jamming that knocks out service or causes to be wrong intermittently would be just as effective in many cases as steady blanket jamming... especially if there is little expectation that this might be a threat. (Clearly the military has considered all this carefully, but not necessarily for the civilian uses they may not even know about). And while restoring a destroyed Loran C site might take a while, launching a new GPS satellite to replace one destroyed by some natural event (solar outbursts) or some man made event (clouds of debris - either deliberate or accidental) takes MUCH longer and cannot be hurried up much. I doubt many flight ready spares are kept around (including rocket and all the rest) and even if there are one or two a major event could take out more than that number if it is at all global in impact. -- Dave Emery N1PRE/AE, die@dieconsulting.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493 "An empty zombie mind with a forlorn barely readable weatherbeaten 'For Rent' sign still vainly flapping outside on the weed encrusted pole - in celebration of what could have been, but wasn't and is not to be now either."
JC
Jim Cotton
Mon, Nov 16, 2009 6:00 PM

Just a data point about timing applications and jamming....

The HP 8935A CDMA base station test set when first released covered
0-1.0 Ghz and 1.7-2.0 Ghz on the spectrum analyzer function.

It was expanded to 1.4-2.0 Ghz on the upper range expressly for doing
GPS noise surveys of sites, to locate local interference.

Jim Cotton
n8qoh

Just a data point about timing applications and jamming.... The HP 8935A CDMA base station test set when first released covered 0-1.0 Ghz and 1.7-2.0 Ghz on the spectrum analyzer function. It was expanded to 1.4-2.0 Ghz on the upper range expressly for doing GPS noise surveys of sites, to locate local interference. Jim Cotton n8qoh