So my takeaway is that the Navy has all this multi-gazillion dollar
military spec navigational equipment. Yet, it doesn't have half the
capability of the retail gear installed in pleasure craft that can be
had for a fraction of the cost of the hardware that holds that mil-spec
gear in its mounts.  Bureaucracy at its finest. Politics at its worst.
Disappointing.

Steve Sipe
Wrightsville Beach

On 11/17/2017 7:18 PM, Rich Gano via Trawlers-and-Trawlering wrote:

Steve, your disappointment about AIS integration on some (not all) Navy ships like being disappointed that a charging rhino cannot turn on a dime.  Remember, the current DDG class of ships we have in our Navy started building in around 1989.  As the last of the frigates leave the Navy and the very few cruisers left age out, these DDGs will be our only class of blue water carrier escort and surface combatant left.  There are actually now a number of sub-classes of this ship, but all have pretty much similar bridge equipment composing the system-of-systems I spoke of.  They are all nonetheless the standard against which the world's naval forces measure their own surface warfare ships meaning they are about as good as it gets for the ability to fight the battles they are designed for.  There are a lot of them now (newest one entered the fleet a day or two ago), and the Navy is telling us that bridge configuration control across that many ships is difficult given the lack of both time (national tasking) and money (Congress) available.  The Navy was actually very much out in front with electronic charting and does well with it, but then add-on stuff like AIS comes along, and we find glitches like it messes with the Mil Spec integrated radar and chart systems faster than those systems can be updated or in some cases maybe even replaced at monstrous costs to us all.

I can add Furuno AIS to my own Furuno plotter/radar because I found an old Furuno AIS online, but can I do that to every Furuno-equipped Mainship 30 Pilot II out there?  As note in the Review, some ships are sticking commercial stuff like mine on their bridges, but the bridge team's backup in CIC still cannot see the same picture complete with AIS down four decks below on their Aegis Weapon System's scopes - yet.  So if I took my system and stuck it on the bridge of a destroyer, I alone could see the radar/AIS/chart picture on a non-Navy certified system while the rest of the bridge and CIC crews are using the Navy-certified electronic charting system (which they MUST use) to safely navigate the channel with no AIS to complete the picture.

As an a personal example of how this add-on commercial equipment can affect the bridge team, I was Executive Officer on a DDG in 1981 one dark night when I used a standalone Pathfinder commercial radar on the bridge to find our way through an intense snow storm which broke on us just after we entered the channel.  As the Navigator, OOD, and Captain with CIC assist kept up with the traditional radar navigation plot, I tuned my little radar to be able to see ahead one set of channel buoys to ensure we did not actually hit a buoy.  My set, which only I could observe gave enough definition to let me tell the Captain and Conning Officer (my radar was between them) that we needed to come a degree or two left or right to ensure safe passage through each set of buoys. I was not looking ahead for the next turn, nor did I even know what course we would be steering because the nav team had that in hand.  But, still, I was the only person who could see our way at bare steerageway between the marks as they approached our bow.  All I did was make sure we slid between the marks I saw coming at us on my course-up only display and to help find the pier as we left the channel.  We actually tossed the mooring line messengers to the line handlers on the pier without being able to see the pier from the bridge.  BTW, there was no Navy technician aboard trained in the operation or maintenance of this little store bought radar, and we had no spare parts.

AIS by itself might not have made any real difference in the two collisions, given the state of training and other factors on the two DDGs.  While I did not discuss the Comprehensive Review's comments on the state and methods of training of our bridge watch officers and enlisted, it delved quite deeply therein and made far reaching recommendations.  As an example, the Junior Officer-of-the Deck in the Fitzgerald and I think the helmsman were temporary assignments from a cruiser undergoing repair, and they were not specifically trained on the Fitzgerald's very different bridge.  The review made recommendations for how such temporarily assigned personnel should be certified in the future, but don't you think the Fitzgerald's Captain is to blame for having non-certified people on watch in a dense sea lane?  Such temporary assignments have been a long standing practice in the Navy, and I personally sent many 16-inch gunners mates to the USS NEW JERSEY from the IOWA while we were still getting ready to re-commission, and they received invaluable training there, as did some of our future helmsmen.

By the way, the Review also quoted some results of merchant marine bridge officer knowledge testing noting that fully a third did not know how to tune a radar; so the Navy is not alone here.  Merchant ships regularly do stupid stuff too!

As a reader knowledgeable in the full breadth of the norms, language, and culture of the surface Navy, I see this in-depth review as a refreshingly complete baring of the chest on the part of the Navy.  There are things being done immediately to stem the tide of accidents, but my personal takeaway is that the money and time will never be available to do it all and that it will take years rather than days, weeks, or months to complete some of the needed institutional corrections.  And THAT is disappointing.

Rich Gano
FROLIC 2005 Mainship 30 Pilot II
Panama City, FL