JF
J. Forster
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 9:10 PM
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
to unravel the drones stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is
where the bird loses its brain."
The spoofing technique that the Iranians used which took into account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
made the drone land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Irans nuclear program.
Now this engineers account of how Iran took over one of Americas most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraqhttp://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible to manipulation, says
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
it is certainly possible to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology
is there.
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Irans apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
deception of the aggressive systems, said Gholizadeh, such that we can
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would
change to our desired destination.
Gholizadeh said that all the movements of these [enemy drones] were being
watched, and obstructing their work was always on our agenda.
That interview has since been pulled from Fars Persian-language website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious suggesting the electronic
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance,
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Irans capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst
ridiculed Irans capability, telling Defense News that the loss was like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us
but it could be amazing for others, deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to blind a CIA spy
satellite by aiming a laser burst quite accurately.
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence"
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
futurehttp://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos National
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that
it is not, reads the Los Alamos report. In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
targets true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To better cope with hostile electronic attacks, the US Air Force in late
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 the same year that the
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Irans
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson*,
the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
further identified for security reasons.
*
© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
Best,
-John
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
to unravel the drones stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is
where the bird loses its brain."
The spoofing technique that the Iranians used which took into account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
made the drone land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Irans nuclear program.
Now this engineers account of how Iran took over one of Americas most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month>
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible to manipulation, says
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
it is certainly possible to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology
is there.
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Irans apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
*Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'*<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast>
We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
deception of the aggressive systems, said Gholizadeh, such that we can
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would
change to our desired destination.
Gholizadeh said that all the movements of these [enemy drones] were being
watched, and obstructing their work was always on our agenda.
That interview has since been pulled from Fars Persian-language website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious suggesting the electronic
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance,
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Irans capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst
ridiculed Irans capability, telling Defense News that the loss was like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us
but it could be amazing for others, deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation>
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to blind a CIA spy
satellite by aiming a laser burst quite accurately.
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence"
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out
how they can jam GPS," he says.
*Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future*<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future>
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos National
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that
it is not, reads the Los Alamos report. In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
targets true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To better cope with hostile electronic attacks, the US Air Force in late
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 the same year that the
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Irans
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not
stay away."
** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson>*,
the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
further identified for security reasons.
*
*© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#>
Best,
-John
===============
JP
Jim Palfreyman
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:06 PM
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is
where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<
http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology
is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'<
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would
change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being
watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance,
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst
ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<
http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence"
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future<
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that
it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
> drone's systems inside Iran.
>
> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
> to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
> be named for his safety.
>
> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
>
> "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
> Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
> "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
> [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is
> where the bird loses its brain."
>
> The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
> precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
> made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
> crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
> center, says the engineer.
>
> The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
> Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening
> covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
> scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the
> Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
>
> Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
> sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
> techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
> sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
> engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
> signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
> Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
> Iraq<
> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
> >
>
> Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
> indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
>
> "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says
> former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
> it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
> flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology
> is there.”
>
> In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded
> live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
> inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
> actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
>
> Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over
> its nuclear program.
>
> Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
> defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
> described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
> missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
>
> *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
> 'beast'*<
> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
> >
>
> “We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
> ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can
> define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would
> change to our desired destination.”
>
> Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being
> watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
>
> That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
> And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
> which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic
> warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
>
> *Iran's growing electronic capabilities
> *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be
> "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
>
> Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will
> "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of
> any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance,
> now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
>
> US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
> far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst
> ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
> dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
>
> A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are
> a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
>
> “Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other
> advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
> like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
> commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
> Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
> 'spying'<
> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
> >
>
> According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
> intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
> sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
> satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
>
> More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the
> engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
> accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence"
> pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
> users.
>
> Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
> difficult, asserts the engineer.
>
> *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
> *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
> countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
> vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
> Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
> Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
> data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
> laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
> they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
> exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern
> military depends.
> "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
> controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3
> players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
> from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
> Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
> Australia.
>
> "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
> civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out
> how they can jam GPS," he says.
>
> *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
> future*<
> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
> >
>
> The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the
> GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
> purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National
> Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
> overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
>
> “A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
> signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that
> it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
> attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
> target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
> position.”
>
> The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
> communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
> successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
> "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
>
> To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late
> September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
> warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
> Defense Update website.
>
> Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
> for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
> GPS service, making it more robust."
>
> *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
> *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
> and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the
> RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
> state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
> In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
> drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
> including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
> enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
>
> In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
> northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years
> of close observation.
>
> Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left
> wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
> banners.
>
> The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
> made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
> altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
> meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
> landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
>
> Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s
> electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed.
>
> "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have
> you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
> When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it
> might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not
> stay away."
>
> ** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
> >*,
> the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
> journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
> further identified for security reasons.
> *
>
> *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
>
> <
> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
> >
>
>
> Best,
>
> -John
> ===============
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
CP
Charles P. Steinmetz
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:17 PM
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
-- snip --
If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to
countries like Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial
guidance system to back up and "reality check" the GPS. (Omitting
IGS would be such a major gaffe that it calls into question the
veracity of the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
Best regards,
Charles
John wrote:
>Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
>Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
>territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
>Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
>hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
>US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
>drone's systems inside Iran.
-- snip --
If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to
countries like Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial
guidance system to back up and "reality check" the GPS. (Omitting
IGS would be such a major gaffe that it calls into question the
veracity of the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
Best regards,
Charles
CH
Chuck Harris
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:21 PM
In the 1970's, and 80's, US universities educated great quantities of
Iranian students. Although there were some duds, most were very smart.
I've worked with several that could easily hack such a drone. Hell,
there were Iranian engineers that helped design the GPS satellites and
receivers.
Should it be any surprise that they know how to do such things?
The only savings grace is so many of the US educated Iranian engineers
stayed in the US to live... but certainly not all. How many have drifted
back home after the wave of anti-muslim/anti-arab-looking-people craze that
hit the US post 9/11 is anybody's guess.
-Chuck Harris
J. Forster wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
In the 1970's, and 80's, US universities educated great quantities of
Iranian students. Although there were some duds, most were very smart.
I've worked with several that could easily hack such a drone. Hell,
there were Iranian engineers that helped design the GPS satellites and
receivers.
Should it be any surprise that they know how to do such things?
The only savings grace is so many of the US educated Iranian engineers
stayed in the US to live... but certainly not all. How many have drifted
back home after the wave of anti-muslim/anti-arab-looking-people craze that
hit the US post 9/11 is anybody's guess.
-Chuck Harris
J. Forster wrote:
> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
> drone's systems inside Iran.
>
> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications
> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying
> to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not
> be named for his safety.
>
> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
AB
Azelio Boriani
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:24 PM
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman jim77742@gmail.com wrote:
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'<
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future<
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
further identified for security reasons.
*
© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor
<
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman <jim77742@gmail.com> wrote:
> Fascinating.
>
> I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
> strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
> control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
> very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
> positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
>
> But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
> work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
> transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
> no good.
>
> It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
>
> Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
>
> Jim
>
>
> On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>
> > Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
> > Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
> > territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
> > Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
> > hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
> > US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
> > drone's systems inside Iran.
> >
> > Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
> communications
> > links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
> > works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
> trying
> > to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
> not
> > be named for his safety.
> >
> > Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
> > technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
> > specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
> > in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
> Afghanistan.
> >
> > "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
> > Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
> > "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
> > [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
> is
> > where the bird loses its brain."
> >
> > The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
> > precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
> > made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
> > crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
> > center, says the engineer.
> >
> > The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
> > Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
> ever-widening
> > covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
> > scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
> the
> > Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
> >
> > Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
> > sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
> > techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
> > sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
> > engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
> > signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
> > Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
> > Iraq<
> >
> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
> > >
> >
> > Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
> > indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
> plausible.
> >
> > "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
> says
> > former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
> > it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
> > flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
> technology
> > is there.”
> >
> > In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
> downloaded
> > live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
> > inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
> > actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
> >
> > Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
> over
> > its nuclear program.
> >
> > Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
> > defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
> > described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
> > missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
> >
> > *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
> > 'beast'*<
> >
> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
> > >
> >
> > “We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
> > ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
> can
> > define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
> would
> > change to our desired destination.”
> >
> > Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
> being
> > watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
> >
> > That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
> > And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
> > which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
> electronic
> > warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
> >
> > *Iran's growing electronic capabilities
> > *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
> be
> > "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
> >
> > Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
> will
> > "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
> of
> > any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
> surveillance,
> > now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
> >
> > US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
> > far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
> analyst
> > ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
> > dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
> >
> > A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
> are
> > a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
> >
> > “Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
> other
> > advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
> > like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
> > commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
> > Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
> > 'spying'<
> >
> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
> > >
> >
> > According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
> > intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
> > sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
> > satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
> >
> > More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
> the
> > engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
> > accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
> evidence"
> > pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
> > users.
> >
> > Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
> > difficult, asserts the engineer.
> >
> > *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
> > *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
> > countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
> > vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
> > Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
> > Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
> > data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
> > laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
> > they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
> > exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
> modern
> > military depends.
> > "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
> > controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
> MP3
> > players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
> > from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
> > Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
> > Australia.
> >
> > "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
> > civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
> out
> > how they can jam GPS," he says.
> >
> > *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
> > future*<
> >
> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
> > >
> >
> > The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
> the
> > GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
> > purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
> National
> > Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
> > overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
> >
> > “A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
> > signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
> that
> > it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
> > attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
> > target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
> > position.”
> >
> > The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
> > communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
> > successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
> > "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
> >
> > To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
> late
> > September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
> > warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
> > Defense Update website.
> >
> > Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
> > for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
> > GPS service, making it more robust."
> >
> > *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
> > *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
> > and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
> the
> > RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
> > state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
> > In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
> > drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
> > including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
> > enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
> >
> > In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
> > northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
> years
> > of close observation.
> >
> > Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
> left
> > wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
> > banners.
> >
> > The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
> > made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
> > altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
> > meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
> > landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
> >
> > Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
> Iran’s
> > electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
> dismissed.
> >
> > "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
> "Have
> > you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
> > When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
> it
> > might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
> not
> > stay away."
> >
> > ** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
> > >*,
> > the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
> > journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
> > further identified for security reasons.
> > *
> >
> > *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
> >
> > <
> >
> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
> > >
> >
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > -John
> > ===============
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> > To unsubscribe, go to
> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> > and follow the instructions there.
> >
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
CH
Chuck Harris
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:26 PM
I would say without question the answer is YES!
When the US DOD switched its backing to COTS electronics in all
of its defense hardware, it also went looking for the cheapest
way to get the most bang for the buck with defense hardware.
They certainly would be willing to save 100 lbs of inertial
guidance hardware if 8 ounces of GPS hardware could get the
plane on target.
-Chuck Harris
Charles P. Steinmetz wrote:
If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to countries like
Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial guidance system to back up and
"reality check" the GPS. (Omitting IGS would be such a major gaffe that it calls into
question the veracity of the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
Best regards,
Charles
I would say without question the answer is YES!
When the US DOD switched its backing to COTS electronics in all
of its defense hardware, it also went looking for the cheapest
way to get the most bang for the buck with defense hardware.
They certainly would be willing to save 100 lbs of inertial
guidance hardware if 8 ounces of GPS hardware could get the
plane on target.
-Chuck Harris
Charles P. Steinmetz wrote:
> If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to countries like
> Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial guidance system to back up and
> "reality check" the GPS. (Omitting IGS would be such a major gaffe that it calls into
> question the veracity of the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
>
> Best regards,
>
> Charles
MC
mike cook
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:40 PM
Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:24, Azelio Boriani a écrit :
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman jim77742@gmail.com wrote:
Yup, this looks like the way to go about it. One box can simulate the
whole GNSS constellation. Just need to modify the ephemeris and pump the simulation to a transmitter.
Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:24, Azelio Boriani a écrit :
> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
> one precise timing source.
>
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman <jim77742@gmail.com> wrote:
>
Yup, this looks like the way to go about it. One box can simulate the
whole GNSS constellation. Just need to modify the ephemeris and pump the simulation to a transmitter.
MD
Magnus Danielson
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:49 PM
On 12/15/2011 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman wrote:
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
On 12/15/2011 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman wrote:
> Fascinating.
>
> I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
> strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
> control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
> very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
> positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
>
> But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
> work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
> transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
> no good.
>
> It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
>
> Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
PG
Peter Gottlieb
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 10:57 PM
Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
On 12/15/2011 5:40 PM, mike cook wrote:
Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:24, Azelio Boriani a écrit :
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreymanjim77742@gmail.com wrote:
Yup, this looks like the way to go about it. One box can simulate the
whole GNSS constellation. Just need to modify the ephemeris and pump the simulation to a transmitter.
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 10.0.1415 / Virus Database: 2108/4082 - Release Date: 12/15/11
Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
On 12/15/2011 5:40 PM, mike cook wrote:
> Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:24, Azelio Boriani a écrit :
>
>> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
>> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
>> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
>> one precise timing source.
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman<jim77742@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
> Yup, this looks like the way to go about it. One box can simulate the
> whole GNSS constellation. Just need to modify the ephemeris and pump the simulation to a transmitter.
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
> -----
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
> Version: 10.0.1415 / Virus Database: 2108/4082 - Release Date: 12/15/11
>
>
>
MC
mike cook
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:01 PM
Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:57, Peter Gottlieb a écrit :
Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
Too late, Simulators are on paybay now. Just need deep pockets.
Le 15 déc. 2011 à 23:57, Peter Gottlieb a écrit :
> Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
>
Too late, Simulators are on paybay now. Just need deep pockets.
JF
J. Forster
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:04 PM
I'm not so sure. What if you has one site, antenna, and transmitter and a
dozen signal sources with programmable synthesizers and coders.
The drone antenna is likely omni. The Russians or Chinese could easily
supply that.
-John
================
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it
wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to
the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the
captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
trying
to unravel the drones stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the
Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it
land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
is
where the bird loses its brain."
The spoofing technique that the Iranians used which took into
account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
made the drone land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
ever-widening
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
the
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Irans nuclear program.
Now this engineers account of how Iran took over one of Americas most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<
http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS
spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible to manipulation,
says
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding
that
it is certainly possible to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
technology
is there.
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
downloaded
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Irans apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
over
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'<
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
deception of the aggressive systems, said Gholizadeh, such that we
can
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
would
change to our desired destination.
Gholizadeh said that all the movements of these [enemy drones] were
being
watched, and obstructing their work was always on our agenda.
That interview has since been pulled from Fars Persian-language
website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious suggesting the
electronic
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
be
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
will
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
of
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
surveillance,
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Irans capabilities blame a malfunction, but
so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
analyst
ridiculed Irans capability, telling Defense News that the loss was
like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
are
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
other
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us
but it could be amazing for others, deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<
http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took
place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to blind a CIA spy
satellite by aiming a laser burst quite accurately.
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
the
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were
made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
evidence"
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all
drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
modern
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by
poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
MP3
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a
professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
out
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future<
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
the
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos
National
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were
easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
that
it is not, reads the Los Alamos report. In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
targets true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To better cope with hostile electronic attacks, the US Air Force in
late
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to
the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization
program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the
military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 the same year that
the
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
years
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
left
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
Irans
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown and often
dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
"Have
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied
many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
it
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
not
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
I'm not so sure. What if you has one site, antenna, and transmitter and a
dozen signal sources with programmable synthesizers and coders.
The drone antenna is likely omni. The Russians or Chinese could easily
supply that.
-John
================
> Fascinating.
>
> I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
> strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
> control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
> very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
> positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
>
> But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it
> wouldn't
> work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
> transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
> no good.
>
> It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
>
> Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
>
> Jim
>
>
> On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>
>> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
>> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
>> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
>> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
>> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to
>> the
>> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the
>> captured
>> drone's systems inside Iran.
>>
>> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
>> communications
>> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
>> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
>> trying
>> to unravel the drones stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
>> not
>> be named for his safety.
>>
>> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
>> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the
>> Iranian
>> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it
>> land
>> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
>> Afghanistan.
>>
>> "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
>> Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
>> "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
>> [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
>> is
>> where the bird loses its brain."
>>
>> The spoofing technique that the Iranians used which took into
>> account
>> precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
>>
>> made the drone land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
>> crack the remote-control signals and communications from the US control
>> center, says the engineer.
>>
>> The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
>> Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
>> ever-widening
>> covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
>> scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
>> the
>> Stuxnet computer virus that set back Irans nuclear program.
>>
>> Now this engineers account of how Iran took over one of Americas most
>> sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
>> techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
>> sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
>> engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
>> signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
>> Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
>> Iraq<
>> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
>> >
>>
>> Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS
>> spoofing
>> indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
>> plausible.
>>
>> "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible to manipulation,
>> says
>> former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding
>> that
>> it is certainly possible to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
>> flies on a different course. I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
>> technology
>> is there.
>>
>> In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
>> downloaded
>> live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
>> inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Irans apparent ability now to
>> actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
>>
>> Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
>> over
>> its nuclear program.
>>
>> Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
>> defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
>> described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
>> missile a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
>>
>> *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
>> 'beast'*<
>> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
>> >
>>
>> We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
>> deception of the aggressive systems, said Gholizadeh, such that we
>> can
>> define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
>> would
>> change to our desired destination.
>>
>> Gholizadeh said that all the movements of these [enemy drones] were
>> being
>> watched, and obstructing their work was always on our agenda.
>>
>> That interview has since been pulled from Fars Persian-language
>> website.
>> And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
>> which some Iranian news sites called suspicious suggesting the
>> electronic
>> warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
>>
>> *Iran's growing electronic capabilities
>> *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
>> be
>> "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
>>
>> Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
>> will
>> "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
>> of
>> any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
>> surveillance,
>> now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
>>
>> US officials skeptical of Irans capabilities blame a malfunction, but
>> so
>> far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
>> analyst
>> ridiculed Irans capability, telling Defense News that the loss was
>> like
>> dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.
>>
>> A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
>> are
>> a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
>>
>> Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
>> other
>> advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
>> like a dream for us
but it could be amazing for others, deputy IRGC
>> commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
>> Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
>> 'spying'<
>> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
>> >
>>
>> According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
>> intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took
>> place
>> sometime in the past two years, when it managed to blind a CIA spy
>> satellite by aiming a laser burst quite accurately.
>>
>> More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
>> the
>> engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were
>> made
>> accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
>> evidence"
>> pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
>> users.
>>
>> Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
>> difficult, asserts the engineer.
>>
>> *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
>> *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
>> countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
>> vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
>> Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
>> Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all
>> drone
>> data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after finding militant
>> laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq and acknowledged that
>> they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
>> exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
>> modern
>> military depends.
>> "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by
>> poorly
>> controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
>> MP3
>> players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a
>> professor
>> from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
>> Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
>> Australia.
>>
>> "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
>> civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
>> out
>> how they can jam GPS," he says.
>>
>> *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
>> future*<
>> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
>> >
>>
>> The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
>> the
>> GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
>> purposes. In 2003, a Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos
>> National
>> Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were
>> easily
>> overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
>>
>> A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
>> signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
>> that
>> it is not, reads the Los Alamos report. In a sophisticated spoofing
>> attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
>> targets true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
>> position.
>>
>> The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
>> communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
>> successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
>> "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
>>
>> To better cope with hostile electronic attacks, the US Air Force in
>> late
>> September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
>> warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to
>> the
>> Defense Update website.
>>
>> Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization
>> program"
>> for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the
>> military
>> GPS service, making it more robust."
>>
>> *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
>> *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
>> and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 the same year that
>> the
>> RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
>> state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
>> In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
>> drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones
>> including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
>> enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
>>
>> In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
>> northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
>> years
>> of close observation.
>>
>> Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
>> left
>> wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
>> banners.
>>
>> The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
>> made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
>> altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
>> meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
>> landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
>>
>> Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
>> Irans
>> electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown and often
>> dismissed.
>>
>> "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
>> "Have
>> you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied
>> many-fold."
>> When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
>> it
>> might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
>> not
>> stay away."
>>
>> ** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
>> >*,
>> the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an
>> Iranian
>> journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot
>> be
>> further identified for security reasons.
>> *
>>
>> *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
>>
>> <
>> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
>> >
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> -John
>> ===============
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>
AB
Azelio Boriani
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:21 PM
OK, now I know what a GPS simulator is like. BTW the Spirent is cheaper at
used-line.com than on paybay. Anyway my opinion doesn't change: as pointed
out by David VanHorn they have jammed the GPS and the data link. I think
the data link must be a sophisticated frequency hopping type radio link so,
at most, their skill was to jam that.
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:04 AM, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
I'm not so sure. What if you has one site, antenna, and transmitter and a
dozen signal sources with programmable synthesizers and coders.
The drone antenna is likely omni. The Russians or Chinese could easily
supply that.
-John
================
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it
wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to
the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the
captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
communications
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
trying
to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
not
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the
Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it
land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
is
where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into
account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
–
made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
ever-widening
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
the
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS
spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
says
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding
that
it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
technology
is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
downloaded
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
over
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'<
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
can
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
would
change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
being
watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language
website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
electronic
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
be
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
will
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
of
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
surveillance,
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but
so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
analyst
ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was
“like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
are
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
other
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took
place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
the
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were
made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
evidence"
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all
drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
modern
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by
poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
MP3
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a
professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
out
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future<
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
the
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
National
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were
easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
that
it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
late
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to
the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization
program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the
military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
the
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
years
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
left
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
Iran’s
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
"Have
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied
many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
it
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
not
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson <
the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an
Iranian
journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot
be
further identified for security reasons.
*
© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor
<
OK, now I know what a GPS simulator is like. BTW the Spirent is cheaper at
used-line.com than on paybay. Anyway my opinion doesn't change: as pointed
out by David VanHorn they have jammed the GPS and the data link. I think
the data link must be a sophisticated frequency hopping type radio link so,
at most, their skill was to jam that.
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:04 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
> I'm not so sure. What if you has one site, antenna, and transmitter and a
> dozen signal sources with programmable synthesizers and coders.
>
> The drone antenna is likely omni. The Russians or Chinese could easily
> supply that.
>
> -John
>
> ================
>
>
> > Fascinating.
> >
> > I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
> > strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
> > control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit
> is
> > very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account
> current
> > positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
> >
> > But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it
> > wouldn't
> > work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
> > transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so
> that's
> > no good.
> >
> > It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
> >
> > Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
> >
> > Jim
> >
> >
> > On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
> >> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
> >> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
> >> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
> >> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to
> >> the
> >> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the
> >> captured
> >> drone's systems inside Iran.
> >>
> >> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
> >> communications
> >> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
> >> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
> >> trying
> >> to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
> >> not
> >> be named for his safety.
> >>
> >> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
> >> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the
> >> Iranian
> >> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it
> >> land
> >> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
> >> Afghanistan.
> >>
> >> "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
> >> Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
> >> "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
> >> [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
> >> is
> >> where the bird loses its brain."
> >>
> >> The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into
> >> account
> >> precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data
> >> –
> >> made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
> >> crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
> >> center, says the engineer.
> >>
> >> The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
> >> Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
> >> ever-widening
> >> covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
> >> scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
> >> the
> >> Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
> >>
> >> Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
> >> sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
> >> techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
> >> sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
> >> engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
> >> signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
> >> Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
> >> Iraq<
> >>
> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
> >> >
> >>
> >> Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS
> >> spoofing
> >> indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
> >> plausible.
> >>
> >> "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
> >> says
> >> former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding
> >> that
> >> it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
> >> flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
> >> technology
> >> is there.”
> >>
> >> In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
> >> downloaded
> >> live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
> >> inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
> >> actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
> >>
> >> Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
> >> over
> >> its nuclear program.
> >>
> >> Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
> >> defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
> >> described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
> >> missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
> >>
> >> *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
> >> 'beast'*<
> >>
> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
> >> >
> >>
> >> “We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
> >> ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
> >> can
> >> define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
> >> would
> >> change to our desired destination.”
> >>
> >> Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
> >> being
> >> watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
> >>
> >> That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language
> >> website.
> >> And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
> >> which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
> >> electronic
> >> warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
> >>
> >> *Iran's growing electronic capabilities
> >> *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
> >> be
> >> "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
> >>
> >> Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
> >> will
> >> "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
> >> of
> >> any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
> >> surveillance,
> >> now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
> >>
> >> US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but
> >> so
> >> far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
> >> analyst
> >> ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was
> >> “like
> >> dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
> >>
> >> A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
> >> are
> >> a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
> >>
> >> “Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
> >> other
> >> advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
> >> like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
> >> commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
> >> Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
> >> 'spying'<
> >>
> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
> >> >
> >>
> >> According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
> >> intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took
> >> place
> >> sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
> >> satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
> >>
> >> More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
> >> the
> >> engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were
> >> made
> >> accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
> >> evidence"
> >> pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
> >> users.
> >>
> >> Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
> >> difficult, asserts the engineer.
> >>
> >> *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
> >> *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
> >> countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
> >> vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
> >> Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
> >> Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all
> >> drone
> >> data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
> >> laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
> >> they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
> >> exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
> >> modern
> >> military depends.
> >> "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by
> >> poorly
> >> controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
> >> MP3
> >> players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a
> >> professor
> >> from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
> >> Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
> >> Australia.
> >>
> >> "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
> >> civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
> >> out
> >> how they can jam GPS," he says.
> >>
> >> *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
> >> future*<
> >>
> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
> >> >
> >>
> >> The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
> >> the
> >> GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
> >> purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
> >> National
> >> Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were
> >> easily
> >> overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
> >>
> >> “A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
> >> signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
> >> that
> >> it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
> >> attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
> >> target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
> >> position.”
> >>
> >> The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
> >> communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
> >> successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
> >> "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
> >>
> >> To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
> >> late
> >> September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
> >> warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to
> >> the
> >> Defense Update website.
> >>
> >> Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization
> >> program"
> >> for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the
> >> military
> >> GPS service, making it more robust."
> >>
> >> *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
> >> *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
> >> and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
> >> the
> >> RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
> >> state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
> >> In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
> >> drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
> >> including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
> >> enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
> >>
> >> In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
> >> northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
> >> years
> >> of close observation.
> >>
> >> Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
> >> left
> >> wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
> >> banners.
> >>
> >> The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
> >> made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
> >> altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
> >> meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
> >> landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
> >>
> >> Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
> >> Iran’s
> >> electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
> >> dismissed.
> >>
> >> "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
> >> "Have
> >> you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied
> >> many-fold."
> >> When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
> >> it
> >> might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
> >> not
> >> stay away."
> >>
> >> ** **Scott Peterson* <
> http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
> >> >*,
> >> the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an
> >> Iranian
> >> journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot
> >> be
> >> further identified for security reasons.
> >> *
> >>
> >> *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
> >>
> >> <
> >>
> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> -John
> >> ===============
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> >> To unsubscribe, go to
> >> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> >> and follow the instructions there.
> >>
> >
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> To unsubscribe, go to
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>
JF
J. Forster
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:22 PM
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
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You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
>
> To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
> the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
> timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
> receiver sees.
>
> When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
> timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>
> If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
> would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
> background.
>
> Cheers,
> Magnus
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
AB
Azelio Boriani
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:31 PM
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
so much RF power out.
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster jfor@quikus.com wrote:
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to
https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
so much RF power out.
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>
>
> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>
> -John
>
> ==============
>
>
> >
> > To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
> > the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
> > timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
> > receiver sees.
> >
> > When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
> > timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
> >
> > If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
> > would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
> > background.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Magnus
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> > To unsubscribe, go to
> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> > and follow the instructions there.
> >
> >
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
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> and follow the instructions there.
>
CA
Chris Albertson
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:45 PM
.... Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
so much RF power out.
No. The transmitter could be in an aircraft that follows the drone,
maybe only 100 feet away.
Chris Albertson
Redondo Beach, California
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 3:31 PM, Azelio Boriani
<azelio.boriani@screen.it> wrote:
> .... Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
> so much RF power out.
No. The transmitter could be in an aircraft that follows the drone,
maybe only 100 feet away.
Chris Albertson
Redondo Beach, California
PT
Pieter ten Pierick
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:52 PM
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to
https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
Hi,
> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
> coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
>
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>>
>> -John
>>
>> ==============
>>
>>
>> >
>> > To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
>> > the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>> > timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
>> > receiver sees.
>> >
>> > When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
>> > timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>> >
>> > If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
>> > would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>> > background.
>> >
>> > Cheers,
>> > Magnus
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> > To unsubscribe, go to
>> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> > and follow the instructions there.
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
PT
Pieter ten Pierick
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:52 PM
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to
https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
Hi,
> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
> coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
>
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>>
>> -John
>>
>> ==============
>>
>>
>> >
>> > To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
>> > the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>> > timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
>> > receiver sees.
>> >
>> > When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
>> > timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>> >
>> > If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
>> > would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>> > background.
>> >
>> > Cheers,
>> > Magnus
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> > To unsubscribe, go to
>> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> > and follow the instructions there.
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
> _______________________________________________
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> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
AB
Azelio Boriani
Thu, Dec 15, 2011 11:56 PM
Yes, agree. An OCXO is enough (but my opinion is the same: only jammed not
steered).
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Pieter ten Pierick <
time-nuts-mail@tenpierick.com> wrote:
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
background.
Cheers,
Magnus
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to
https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
Yes, agree. An OCXO is enough (but my opinion is the same: only jammed not
steered).
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Pieter ten Pierick <
time-nuts-mail@tenpierick.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
> > own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
> > coverage, so much RF power out.
>
> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
> Very directional with large ampification.
> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
> by hand will work.
> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
> the drone,
> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
> relative timing will be fixed.
> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
> the system to work, I would think.
> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
> stability is not that important...
>
> Greetings,
> Pieter.
> >
> > On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
> >>
> >> -John
> >>
> >> ==============
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >> > To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
> >> > the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
> >> > timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what the
> >> > receiver sees.
> >> >
> >> > When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough in
> >> > timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
> >> >
> >> > If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work. I
> >> > would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
> >> > background.
> >> >
> >> > Cheers,
> >> > Magnus
> >> >
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> >> > To unsubscribe, go to
> >> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> >> > and follow the instructions there.
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> >> To unsubscribe, go to
> >> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> >> and follow the instructions there.
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> > To unsubscribe, go to
> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> > and follow the instructions there.
> >
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
JF
J. Forster
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 12:00 AM
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
path.
From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
path.
>From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
> Hi,
>
>> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
>> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
>> coverage, so much RF power out.
>
> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
> Very directional with large ampification.
> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
> by hand will work.
> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
> the drone,
> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
> relative timing will be fixed.
> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
> the system to work, I would think.
> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
> stability is not that important...
>
> Greetings,
> Pieter.
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster <jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>>>
>>> -John
>>>
>>> ==============
>>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> > To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
>>> > the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>>> > timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
>>> the
>>> > receiver sees.
>>> >
>>> > When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
>>> in
>>> > timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>>> >
>>> > If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
>>> I
>>> > would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>>> > background.
>>> >
>>> > Cheers,
>>> > Magnus
>>> >
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> > To unsubscribe, go to
>>> > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> > and follow the instructions there.
>>> >
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
G
gary
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 12:14 AM
Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
know about the base in Baluchistan.
But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
path.
From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
know about the base in Baluchistan.
But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
> KISS guys.
>
> Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
> When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
> the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
> path.
>
>> From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
> jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
> could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
>
> FWIW,
>
> -John
>
> ================
>
>
>
>> Hi,
>>
>>> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
>>> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
>>> coverage, so much RF power out.
>>
>> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
>> Very directional with large ampification.
>> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
>> by hand will work.
>> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
>> the drone,
>> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
>> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
>> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
>> relative timing will be fixed.
>> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
>> the system to work, I would think.
>> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
>> stability is not that important...
>>
>> Greetings,
>> Pieter.
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster<jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>>>>
>>>> -John
>>>>
>>>> ==============
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
>>>>> the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>>>>> timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
>>>> the
>>>>> receiver sees.
>>>>>
>>>>> When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
>>>> in
>>>>> timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>>>>>
>>>>> If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
>>>> I
>>>>> would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>>>>> background.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> Magnus
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
BC
Bob Camp
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 12:30 AM
Hi
Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or straight down from above it).
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't know about the base in Baluchistan.
But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target. Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
path.
From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
Hi
Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or straight down from above it).
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
> Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't know about the base in Baluchistan.
>
> But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target. Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
>
>
> On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
>> KISS guys.
>>
>> Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
>> When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell and
>> the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the flight
>> path.
>>
>>> From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
>> jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash. They
>> could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
>>
>> FWIW,
>>
>> -John
>>
>> ================
>>
>>
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on your
>>>> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
>>>> coverage, so much RF power out.
>>>
>>> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
>>> Very directional with large ampification.
>>> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the drone
>>> by hand will work.
>>> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is on
>>> the drone,
>>> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the start?)
>>> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
>>> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
>>> relative timing will be fixed.
>>> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to allow
>>> the system to work, I would think.
>>> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long term
>>> stability is not that important...
>>>
>>> Greetings,
>>> Pieter.
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster<jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the jammer.
>>>>>
>>>>> -John
>>>>>
>>>>> ==============
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to generate
>>>>>> the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>>>>>> timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
>>>>> the
>>>>>> receiver sees.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
>>>>> in
>>>>>> timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If this scenario is true... then they have not done their home-work.
>>>>> I
>>>>>> would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>>>>>> background.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Magnus
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
JF
J. Forster
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 12:41 AM
Maybe you can hear them taking off?
-John
=============
Hi
Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or
straight down from above it).
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
know about the base in Baluchistan.
But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell
and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the
flight
path.
From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash.
They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on
your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the
drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is
on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the
start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to
allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long
term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the
jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to
generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their
home-work.
Maybe you can hear them taking off?
-John
=============
> Hi
>
> Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or
> straight down from above it).
>
> Bob
>
>
> On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
>
>> Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
>> know about the base in Baluchistan.
>>
>> But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
>> Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
>>> KISS guys.
>>>
>>> Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
>>> When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell
>>> and
>>> the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the
>>> flight
>>> path.
>>>
>>>> From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
>>> jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash.
>>> They
>>> could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
>>>
>>> FWIW,
>>>
>>> -John
>>>
>>> ================
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>>> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on
>>>>> your
>>>>> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
>>>>> coverage, so much RF power out.
>>>>
>>>> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
>>>> Very directional with large ampification.
>>>> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the
>>>> drone
>>>> by hand will work.
>>>> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is
>>>> on
>>>> the drone,
>>>> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the
>>>> start?)
>>>> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
>>>> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
>>>> relative timing will be fixed.
>>>> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to
>>>> allow
>>>> the system to work, I would think.
>>>> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long
>>>> term
>>>> stability is not that important...
>>>>
>>>> Greetings,
>>>> Pieter.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster<jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the
>>>>>> jammer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -John
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ==============
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to
>>>>>>> generate
>>>>>>> the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>>>>>>> timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> receiver sees.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If this scenario is true... then they have not done their
>>>>>>> home-work.
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>> would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>>>>>>> background.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>> Magnus
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
BC
Bob Camp
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 12:53 AM
Hi
Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:41 PM, J. Forster wrote:
Maybe you can hear them taking off?
-John
=============
Hi
Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or
straight down from above it).
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
know about the base in Baluchistan.
But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
KISS guys.
Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell
and
the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the
flight
path.
From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash.
They
could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
FWIW,
-John
================
Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on
your
own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
coverage, so much RF power out.
Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
Very directional with large ampification.
If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the
drone
by hand will work.
After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is
on
the drone,
I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the
start?)
The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
relative timing will be fixed.
Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to
allow
the system to work, I would think.
As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long
term
stability is not that important...
Greetings,
Pieter.
You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the
jammer.
-John
==============
To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to
generate
the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
receiver sees.
When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
If this scenario is true... then they have not done their
home-work.
Hi
Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:41 PM, J. Forster wrote:
> Maybe you can hear them taking off?
>
> -John
>
> =============
>
>
>> Hi
>>
>> Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or
>> straight down from above it).
>>
>> Bob
>>
>>
>> On Dec 15, 2011, at 7:14 PM, gary wrote:
>>
>>> Kandahar has proven poor opsec since the thing was photographed! I don't
>>> know about the base in Baluchistan.
>>>
>>> But even knowing the launch doesn't mean they know when it is on target.
>>> Supposedly the UAS is stealthy, so it would be hard to detect.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/15/2011 4:00 PM, J. Forster wrote:
>>>> KISS guys.
>>>>
>>>> Suppose the Iranians had one of their buddies watching the drone base.
>>>> When they saw a drone take off, the guy just called a contact by cell
>>>> and
>>>> the Iranians turned on a wide coverage jammer somewhere along the
>>>> flight
>>>> path.
>>>>
>>>>> From previous incidents and observations, if the drone came into the
>>>> jammed area, it'd lose GPS lock, orbit, and run out of gas and crash.
>>>> They
>>>> could easily select a jammer site that was good for recovery.
>>>>
>>>> FWIW,
>>>>
>>>> -John
>>>>
>>>> ================
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course, but then when you switch on your transmitter you are on
>>>>>> your
>>>>>> own. Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great
>>>>>> coverage, so much RF power out.
>>>>>
>>>>> Easy: Use a dish antenna on the transmitter.
>>>>> Very directional with large ampification.
>>>>> If using a 'moderate' opening angle, just pointing the dish at the
>>>>> drone
>>>>> by hand will work.
>>>>> After starting the system locked to the gps time, once the signal is
>>>>> on
>>>>> the drone,
>>>>> I don't think it matters anymore. (It might not even matter at the
>>>>> start?)
>>>>> The drone will follow the timing of the jammer.
>>>>> As the drone will receive all signals from the single transmitter, the
>>>>> relative timing will be fixed.
>>>>> Just using a OCXO will have a good enough short time stability to
>>>>> allow
>>>>> the system to work, I would think.
>>>>> As the plan is to land or jam the drone within say 10 minutes, long
>>>>> term
>>>>> stability is not that important...
>>>>>
>>>>> Greetings,
>>>>> Pieter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:22 AM, J. Forster<jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You could just have a GPS receiver and use that to sync up the
>>>>>>> jammer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -John
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ==============
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To transmit a GPS cluster signal you need a GPS simulator to
>>>>>>>> generate
>>>>>>>> the cluster so even a single transmitter can do this, the relative
>>>>>>>> timing and not the different positions of the transmitters is what
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> receiver sees.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When over-powering the real birds you just needs to be close enough
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> timing, and it is the location of the target which is of interest.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If this scenario is true... then they have not done their
>>>>>>>> home-work.
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> would ask a number of critical questions already from my civilian
>>>>>>>> background.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>> Magnus
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:11 AM
On 12/15/11 2:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman wrote:
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
This would be insanely difficult to do. and hmm.. do you think that the
antenna on the drone is pointing UP (towards the GPS constellation) or
down (towards jammers?). The only people pointing antennas down are
ones experimenting with precision landing systems and pseudolites or
people doing bistatic radar using GPS as illuminators.
As Jim points out you have to time the signals very carefully, and think
about what the jamming signals needs to look like... you have to (very
accurately) know where the victim is (so that you can broadcast your
spoofing signals with the correct timing so that they arrive at the
victim within a fraction of chip.. Let's see now, that UAV is covered
with radar absorbing material, and the shape is such that it probably
has a radar cross section of a few square centimeters. How will you
know where it is accurately enough to generate that spoofing signal
(say, within a meter).
And, of course and it has to start synced with the real GPS signal so it
can pull it off gradually)
Oh, and you need to be able to encrypt the fake GPS signal (assuming
that the UAV is using a P/Y capable receiver).
AND, your "spoof trajectory" has to be carefully designed so that it's
not too different from what the UAVs internal IMU is telling it. After
all, a failure of GPS or IMU is something they design for, so they're
always cross checking (just like human pilots do.. Hey, GPS is
reading 500kts and I'm in a Piper Cherokee... I think the GPS on the blink)
Nope.. UAV engine quits, it goes into "glide to the ground doing the
least damage" mode... UAV ditches in a gravel and sand covered field
(with which much of eastern Iran is covered).
Even LightSquared, idiotic and pernicious as it may be, would have a
hard time bringing down a UAV.
On 12/15/11 2:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman wrote:
> Fascinating.
>
> I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
> strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
> control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
> very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
> positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
>
> But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
> work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
> transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
> no good.
>
> It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
>
> Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
>
> Jim
>
>
This would be insanely difficult to do. and hmm.. do you think that the
antenna on the drone is pointing UP (towards the GPS constellation) or
down (towards jammers?). The only people pointing antennas down are
ones experimenting with precision landing systems and pseudolites or
people doing bistatic radar using GPS as illuminators.
As Jim points out you have to time the signals very carefully, and think
about what the jamming signals needs to look like... you have to (very
accurately) know where the victim is (so that you can broadcast your
spoofing signals with the correct timing so that they arrive at the
victim within a fraction of chip.. Let's see now, that UAV is covered
with radar absorbing material, and the shape is such that it probably
has a radar cross section of a few square centimeters. How will you
know where it is accurately enough to generate that spoofing signal
(say, within a meter).
And, of course and it has to start synced with the real GPS signal so it
can pull it off gradually)
Oh, and you need to be able to encrypt the fake GPS signal (assuming
that the UAV is using a P/Y capable receiver).
AND, your "spoof trajectory" has to be carefully designed so that it's
not too different from what the UAVs internal IMU is telling it. After
all, a failure of GPS or IMU is something they design for, so they're
always cross checking (just like human pilots do.. Hey, GPS is
reading 500kts and I'm in a Piper Cherokee... I think the GPS on the blink)
Nope.. UAV engine quits, it goes into "glide to the ground doing the
least damage" mode... UAV ditches in a gravel and sand covered field
(with which much of eastern Iran is covered).
Even LightSquared, idiotic and pernicious as it may be, would have a
hard time bringing down a UAV.
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:11 AM
On 12/15/11 2:17 PM, Charles P. Steinmetz wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
-- snip --
If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to
countries like Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial
guidance system to back up and "reality check" the GPS. (Omitting IGS
would be such a major gaffe that it calls into question the veracity of
the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
Especially since you need the IMU to run the flight controls to keep the
darn thing upright and flying straight.
On 12/15/11 2:17 PM, Charles P. Steinmetz wrote:
> John wrote:
>
>> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
>> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
>> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
>> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
>> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
>> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
>> drone's systems inside Iran.
>
> -- snip --
>
> If the report in the article is true, we deserve to lose drones to
> countries like Iran for not having the sense to install an inertial
> guidance system to back up and "reality check" the GPS. (Omitting IGS
> would be such a major gaffe that it calls into question the veracity of
> the Iranian claims. Were we really that stupid, or that cheap?)
>
Especially since you need the IMU to run the flight controls to keep the
darn thing upright and flying straight.
S.
Steve .
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:15 AM
Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
I'm curious if the lightsquared folks will try to use this as leverage to
debunk the importance of GPS.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 5:57 PM, Peter Gottlieb <nerd@verizon.net> wrote:
> Just watch how GPS stuff will get all restricted now.
>
> I'm curious if the lightsquared folks will try to use this as leverage to
debunk the importance of GPS.
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:20 AM
On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so
ago)...
It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a
moving target.
At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough,
it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a
particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to
know (fairly precisely)
a) the position and velocity of the victim
b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS
signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from
jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that
generate your spoofing signal.
Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is
internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all
have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update
your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of
the victim.
Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its
original military purposes and because you want internal consistency
checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does
it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated
approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a
car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an
airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign
territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you.
There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage
jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they
wouldn't bother on a UAV.
On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
> one precise timing source.
>
>
Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so
ago)...
It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a
moving target.
At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough,
it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a
particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to
know (fairly precisely)
a) the position and velocity of the victim
b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS
signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from
jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that
generate your spoofing signal.
Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is
internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all
have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update
your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of
the victim.
Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its
original military purposes and because you want internal consistency
checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does
it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated
approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a
car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an
airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign
territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you.
There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage
jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they
wouldn't bother on a UAV.
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:21 AM
On 12/15/11 2:26 PM, Chuck Harris wrote:
I would say without question the answer is YES!
When the US DOD switched its backing to COTS electronics in all
of its defense hardware, it also went looking for the cheapest
way to get the most bang for the buck with defense hardware.
They certainly would be willing to save 100 lbs of inertial
guidance hardware if 8 ounces of GPS hardware could get the
plane on target.
except that off the shelf military IMUs are more like half a kilo.
On 12/15/11 2:26 PM, Chuck Harris wrote:
> I would say without question the answer is YES!
>
> When the US DOD switched its backing to COTS electronics in all
> of its defense hardware, it also went looking for the cheapest
> way to get the most bang for the buck with defense hardware.
>
> They certainly would be willing to save 100 lbs of inertial
> guidance hardware if 8 ounces of GPS hardware could get the
> plane on target.
>
except that off the shelf military IMUs are more like half a kilo.
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:24 AM
On 12/15/11 4:30 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
Hi
Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or straight down from above it).
Hard to detect against ground clutter looking down (assuming the Iranis
have suitable radars that can do this). Maybe thermal signature from
exhaust might help.
Stealthy doesn't mean invisible. Think low tech.. a bunch of guys out in
the desert with cellphones .. "I just heard it come over"
On 12/15/11 4:30 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
> Hi
>
> Hard to detect looking horizontally, pretty easy looking straight up (or straight down from above it).
>
Hard to detect against ground clutter looking down (assuming the Iranis
have suitable radars that can do this). Maybe thermal signature from
exhaust might help.
Stealthy doesn't mean invisible. Think low tech.. a bunch of guys out in
the desert with cellphones .. "I just heard it come over"
JL
Jim Lux
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:29 AM
On 12/15/11 4:53 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
Hi
Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
You are right, it does, but it doesn't bounce BACK towards the observer,
which is what you care about. Consider a flat plate at a 45 degree
angle from you. All the radar energy bounces to the side. Turns out
that it's diffraction from the edges of those sides that's the limiting
aspect.
The first stealth planes (e.g. F-117) were all flat surfaces because you
could actually calculate the reflections and make sure you didn't
inadvertently create a corner reflector.
This is one reason that bistatic radar (transmitter and receiver in
different places) is interesting. You can detect things that have very
low monostatic radar cross section (RCS). (also, radar transmitters are
easy to shoot at, because they're like a big beacon saying "here I
am"... so put out a bunch of transmitters and one receiver and have the
expensive signal processing and operators at the receiver, which is
entirely passive).
Even better, you can use something benign as an illuminator... Many of
us have used a TV station as a passive illuminator for a bistatic radar,
using your analog TV set as the detector.
Later, as computational horsepower increased, they could make nice
swoopy surfaces with low RCS, and what's more to the point, low bistatic
RCS.
On 12/15/11 4:53 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
> Hi
>
> Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
>
You are right, it does, but it doesn't bounce BACK towards the observer,
which is what you care about. Consider a flat plate at a 45 degree
angle from you. All the radar energy bounces to the side. Turns out
that it's diffraction from the edges of those sides that's the limiting
aspect.
The first stealth planes (e.g. F-117) were all flat surfaces because you
could actually calculate the reflections and make sure you didn't
inadvertently create a corner reflector.
This is one reason that bistatic radar (transmitter and receiver in
different places) is interesting. You can detect things that have very
low monostatic radar cross section (RCS). (also, radar transmitters are
easy to shoot at, because they're like a big beacon saying "here I
am"... so put out a bunch of transmitters and one receiver and have the
expensive signal processing and operators at the receiver, which is
entirely passive).
Even better, you can use something benign as an illuminator... Many of
us have used a TV station as a passive illuminator for a bistatic radar,
using your analog TV set as the detector.
Later, as computational horsepower increased, they could make nice
swoopy surfaces with low RCS, and what's more to the point, low bistatic
RCS.
BC
Bob Camp
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:53 AM
Hi
Looking at the gizmo they have on display, I'd bet you get a pretty good return off the bottom of the beast. Not quite as good a return off of the top. Indeed the issue does date to F-117 days, they had to calculate mission parameters to keep the "sides" from facing the wrong way...
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:29 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
On 12/15/11 4:53 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
Hi
Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
You are right, it does, but it doesn't bounce BACK towards the observer, which is what you care about. Consider a flat plate at a 45 degree angle from you. All the radar energy bounces to the side. Turns out that it's diffraction from the edges of those sides that's the limiting aspect.
The first stealth planes (e.g. F-117) were all flat surfaces because you could actually calculate the reflections and make sure you didn't inadvertently create a corner reflector.
This is one reason that bistatic radar (transmitter and receiver in different places) is interesting. You can detect things that have very low monostatic radar cross section (RCS). (also, radar transmitters are easy to shoot at, because they're like a big beacon saying "here I am"... so put out a bunch of transmitters and one receiver and have the expensive signal processing and operators at the receiver, which is entirely passive).
Even better, you can use something benign as an illuminator... Many of us have used a TV station as a passive illuminator for a bistatic radar, using your analog TV set as the detector.
Later, as computational horsepower increased, they could make nice swoopy surfaces with low RCS, and what's more to the point, low bistatic RCS.
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
Hi
Looking at the gizmo they have on display, I'd bet you get a pretty good return off the bottom of the beast. Not quite as good a return off of the top. Indeed the issue does date to F-117 days, they had to calculate mission parameters to keep the "sides" from facing the wrong way...
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:29 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
> On 12/15/11 4:53 PM, Bob Camp wrote:
>> Hi
>>
>> Radar bounces off the flat sides very nicely ….
>>
>
> You are right, it does, but it doesn't bounce BACK towards the observer, which is what you care about. Consider a flat plate at a 45 degree angle from you. All the radar energy bounces to the side. Turns out that it's diffraction from the edges of those sides that's the limiting aspect.
>
>
> The first stealth planes (e.g. F-117) were all flat surfaces because you could actually calculate the reflections and make sure you didn't inadvertently create a corner reflector.
>
> This is one reason that bistatic radar (transmitter and receiver in different places) is interesting. You can detect things that have very low monostatic radar cross section (RCS). (also, radar transmitters are easy to shoot at, because they're like a big beacon saying "here I am"... so put out a bunch of transmitters and one receiver and have the expensive signal processing and operators at the receiver, which is entirely passive).
>
> Even better, you can use something benign as an illuminator... Many of us have used a TV station as a passive illuminator for a bistatic radar, using your analog TV set as the detector.
>
>
> Later, as computational horsepower increased, they could make nice swoopy surfaces with low RCS, and what's more to the point, low bistatic RCS.
>
>
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BC
Bob Camp
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 1:56 AM
Hi
Put a $35 eBay rubidium on board and you would have to be sure the time solution stayed correct as the take over was implemented.
I know strange to tie timing into a discussion like this :)….
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:20 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so ago)...
It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a moving target.
At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough, it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to know (fairly precisely)
a) the position and velocity of the victim
b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that generate your spoofing signal.
Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of the victim.
Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its original military purposes and because you want internal consistency checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you. There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they wouldn't bother on a UAV.
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
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Hi
Put a $35 eBay rubidium on board and you would have to be sure the time solution stayed correct as the take over was implemented.
I know strange to tie timing into a discussion like this :)….
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:20 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
> On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
>> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
>> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
>> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
>> one precise timing source.
>>
>>
>
> Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so ago)...
>
> It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a moving target.
>
> At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough, it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
>
> But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to know (fairly precisely)
>
> a) the position and velocity of the victim
> b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
>
> You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that generate your spoofing signal.
>
> Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of the victim.
>
>
> Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its original military purposes and because you want internal consistency checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
>
> Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you. There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they wouldn't bother on a UAV.
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
MC
Michael Costolo
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 2:31 AM
Hi
Put a $35 eBay rubidium on board and you would have to be sure the time solution stayed correct as the take over was implemented.
I know strange to tie timing into a discussion like this :)….
Bob
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:20 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so ago)...
It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a moving target.
At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough, it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to know (fairly precisely)
a) the position and velocity of the victim
b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that generate your spoofing signal.
Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of the victim.
Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its original military purposes and because you want internal consistency checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you. There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they wouldn't bother on a UAV.
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
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and follow the instructions there.
This is all very interesting. I may have missed it if it was posted previously, but here they claim what they did to dupe and land the bird. Now how much of this is true remains to be seen. I'm curious how plausible the story is.
Is there no way to have some validation of the integrity of a GPS signal?
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer
-Mike-
On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:56 PM, Bob Camp <lists@rtty.us> wrote:
> Hi
>
> Put a $35 eBay rubidium on board and you would have to be sure the time solution stayed correct as the take over was implemented.
>
> I know strange to tie timing into a discussion like this :)….
>
> Bob
>
>
> On Dec 15, 2011, at 8:20 PM, Jim Lux wrote:
>
>> On 12/15/11 2:24 PM, Azelio Boriani wrote:
>>> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
>>> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
>>> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
>>> one precise timing source.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Not quite (there's a discussion of this on the list about a year or so ago)...
>>
>> It's harder than you think to generate realistic fake signals for a moving target.
>>
>> At work (JPL) we have a fancy Spirent GPS simulator. And sure enough, it can generate all the signals your receiver would see given a particular path you expect your receiver to follow.
>>
>> But, in order to use that to provide a spoofing signal, you'd need to know (fairly precisely)
>>
>> a) the position and velocity of the victim
>> b) the position and velocity(zero) of the jamming station
>>
>> You calculate what the expected time,code phase, and doppler of the GPS signals would be at the victim. Then, you subtract out the time from jammer to victim and the doppler from jammer to victim, and use that generate your spoofing signal.
>>
>> Then, the trajectory of the spoofed position has to be something that is internally consistent (i.e. the acceleration, velocity, and position all have to agree in the Kalman filter), and you have to continously update your jamming signal with continuously updated position and velocity of the victim.
>>
>>
>> Spoofing GPS is very hard.It was designed to be so, both for its original military purposes and because you want internal consistency checks to make sure you aren't displaying false information to a user.
>>
>> Jamming GPS to deny it is relatively easy. A high power swept tone does it very nicely on inexpensive receivers. There are more sophisticated approaches. You can buy them for $20 on the internet that plug into a car cigarette lighter. You get one of these jammers, put it on an airplane with a big power amplifier and fly above your sovereign territory and you can deny GPS to pretty much everyone underneath you. There are receiver designs that can tolerate tone or swept or barrage jammers, but they are more expensive, heavier, etc, and I suspect they wouldn't bother on a UAV.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> and follow the instructions there.
S
shalimr9@gmail.com
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 2:58 AM
Few aircrafts can fly as high as this plane, not sure the Iranians have one.
Didier KO4BB
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless thingy while I do other things...
-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Albertson albertson.chris@gmail.com
Sender: time-nuts-bounces@febo.com
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 15:45:30
To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurementtime-nuts@febo.com
Reply-To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement
time-nuts@febo.com
Subject: Re: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 3:31 PM, Azelio Boriani
azelio.boriani@screen.it wrote:
.... Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
so much RF power out.
Few aircrafts can fly as high as this plane, not sure the Iranians have one.
Didier KO4BB
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless thingy while I do other things...
-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Albertson <albertson.chris@gmail.com>
Sender: time-nuts-bounces@febo.com
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 15:45:30
To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement<time-nuts@febo.com>
Reply-To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement
<time-nuts@febo.com>
Subject: Re: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 3:31 PM, Azelio Boriani
<azelio.boriani@screen.it> wrote:
> .... Considering the speed of a drone (700Km/h?) you need a great coverage,
> so much RF power out.
No. The transmitter could be in an aircraft that follows the drone,
maybe only 100 feet away.
Chris Albertson
Redondo Beach, California
_______________________________________________
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
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and follow the instructions there.
BC
Brooke Clarke
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 4:11 AM
There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
one precise timing source.
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreymanjim77742@gmail.com wrote:
Fascinating.
I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
no good.
It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
Jim
On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forsterjfor@quikus.com wrote:
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
"electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
[jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
Iraq<
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
'beast'<
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
*Iran's growing electronic capabilities
*Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
"in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
"absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
'spying'<
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
difficult, asserts the engineer.
*US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
*Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
how they can jam GPS," he says.
Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
future<
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
"seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
GPS service, making it more robust."
*Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
*Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
stay away."
** *Scott Peterson<http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
further identified for security reasons.
*
© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor
<
Hi Azelio:
Yes, see:
a first generation single signal GPS generator
http://www.prc68.com/I/5001A.html
and a newer GPS sig gen that can simulate 5 L1 and 5 L2 signals:
http://www.prc68.com/I/NTgpsSTR2760.shtml
Not only is precise timing not required, there's no provision for it on the NT SRT2760 simulator.
The method of capturing the drone I think I've figured out.
Have Fun,
Brooke Clarke
http://www.PRC68.com
http://www.end2partygovernment.com/Brooke4Congress.html
Azelio Boriani wrote:
> There are GPS simulators for lab use (never seen live or in a picture), I
> suppose they have one connector to feed the GPS receiver antenna.
> Generating in one equipment all the signals you don't need many but only
> one precise timing source.
>
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Jim Palfreyman<jim77742@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Fascinating.
>>
>> I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out
>> strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could
>> control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is
>> very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current
>> positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
>>
>> But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't
>> work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of
>> transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's
>> no good.
>>
>> It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location.
>>
>> Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive.
>>
>> Jim
>>
>>
>> On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster<jfor@quikus.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
>>> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
>>> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
>>> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
>>> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
>>> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
>>> drone's systems inside Iran.
>>>
>>> Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off
>> communications
>>> links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who
>>> works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently
>> trying
>>> to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could
>> not
>>> be named for his safety.
>>>
>>> Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a
>>> technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian
>>> specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land
>>> in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in
>> Afghanistan.
>>> "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the
>>> Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's
>>> "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise
>>> [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This
>> is
>>> where the bird loses its brain."
>>>
>>> The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account
>>> precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data –
>>> made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to
>>> crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control
>>> center, says the engineer.
>>>
>>> The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US,
>>> Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an
>> ever-widening
>>> covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear
>>> scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and
>> the
>>> Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
>>>
>>> Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most
>>> sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The
>>> techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less
>>> sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the
>>> engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS
>>> signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
>>> Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in
>>> Iraq<
>>>
>> http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month
>>> Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing
>>> indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is
>> plausible.
>>> "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation,
>> says
>>> former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that
>>> it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it
>>> flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the
>> technology
>>> is there.”
>>>
>>> In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have
>> downloaded
>>> live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with
>>> inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to
>>> actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
>>>
>>> Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted
>> over
>>> its nuclear program.
>>>
>>> Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air
>>> defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
>>> described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided
>>> missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
>>>
>>> *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the
>>> 'beast'*<
>>>
>> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast
>>> “We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning
>>> ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we
>> can
>>> define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile
>> would
>>> change to our desired destination.”
>>>
>>> Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were
>> being
>>> watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
>>>
>>> That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website.
>>> And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack,
>>> which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the
>> electronic
>>> warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
>>>
>>> *Iran's growing electronic capabilities
>>> *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to
>> be
>>> "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
>>>
>>> Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US
>> will
>>> "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence
>> of
>>> any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such
>> surveillance,
>>> now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
>>>
>>> US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so
>>> far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American
>> analyst
>>> ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like
>>> dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
>>>
>>> A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There
>> are
>>> a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
>>>
>>> “Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and
>> other
>>> advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem
>>> like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC
>>> commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
>>> Iran: Obama should apologize for drone
>>> 'spying'<
>>>
>> http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation
>>> According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western
>>> intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place
>>> sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy
>>> satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
>>>
>>> More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says
>> the
>>> engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made
>>> accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial
>> evidence"
>>> pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on
>>> users.
>>>
>>> Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more
>>> difficult, asserts the engineer.
>>>
>>> *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
>>> *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone
>>> countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of
>>> vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the
>>> Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
>>> Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone
>>> data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant
>>> laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that
>>> they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily
>>> exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the
>> modern
>>> military depends.
>>> "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly
>>> controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and
>> MP3
>>> players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor
>>> from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial
>>> Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in
>>> Australia.
>>>
>>> "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and
>>> civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked
>> out
>>> how they can jam GPS," he says.
>>>
>>> *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control
>>> future*<
>>>
>> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future
>>> The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to
>> the
>>> GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian
>>> purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos
>> National
>>> Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily
>>> overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
>>>
>>> “A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS
>>> signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time
>> that
>>> it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing
>>> attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving
>>> target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false
>>> position.”
>>>
>>> The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago
>>> communications security conference in October laid out parameters for
>>> successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a
>>> "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
>>>
>>> To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in
>> late
>>> September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation
>>> warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the
>>> Defense Update website.
>>>
>>> Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program"
>>> for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military
>>> GPS service, making it more robust."
>>>
>>> *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
>>> *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer,
>>> and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that
>> the
>>> RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then
>>> state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
>>> In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth)
>>> drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones –
>>> including one that had been watching over the underground uranium
>>> enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
>>>
>>> In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside
>>> northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two
>> years
>>> of close observation.
>>>
>>> Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the
>> left
>>> wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American
>>> banners.
>>>
>>> The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we
>>> made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same
>>> altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few
>>> meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in
>>> landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
>>>
>>> Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month,
>> Iran’s
>>> electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often
>> dismissed.
>>> "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer.
>> "Have
>>> you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold."
>>> When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware
>> it
>>> might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could
>> not
>>> stay away."
>>>
>>> ** **Scott Peterson*<http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson
>>>> *,
>>> the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian
>>> journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be
>>> further identified for security reasons.
>>> *
>>>
>>> *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor*
>>>
>>> <
>>>
>> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/#
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> -John
>>> ===============
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>>> To unsubscribe, go to
>>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>>> and follow the instructions there.
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
>> To unsubscribe, go to
>> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
>> and follow the instructions there.
>>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
>
CA
Chris Albertson
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 4:34 AM
Is there no way to have some validation of the integrity of a GPS signal?
Yes there is. One way is to cary an inertial navigation system and
compare you position using INS and GPS and if they differ try and
guess which is correct. You can also have the third nab system that
uses radar to match the topography. Cruise missile cary all three
but then those were designed to cary atomic warheads. My bet is this
drone was considered expendable and build as cheaply as something like
this can be built
I doubt one could spoof GPS to the degree required to land an
airplane. But looks at how straight the skin is, I doubt it crashed
into the ground either.
I suspect this drone did not use any truly sensitive technology as
they had to figure a few would crash or get shot down.
Chris Albertson
Redondo Beach, California
On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 6:31 PM, Michael Costolo
<michael.costolo@gmail.com> wrote:
> Is there no way to have some validation of the integrity of a GPS signal?
Yes there is. One way is to cary an inertial navigation system and
compare you position using INS and GPS and if they differ try and
guess which is correct. You can also have the third nab system that
uses radar to match the topography. Cruise missile cary all three
but then those were designed to cary atomic warheads. My bet is this
drone was considered expendable and build as cheaply as something like
this can be built
I doubt one could spoof GPS to the degree required to land an
airplane. But looks at how straight the skin is, I doubt it crashed
into the ground either.
I suspect this drone did not use any truly sensitive technology as
they had to figure a few would crash or get shot down.
Chris Albertson
Redondo Beach, California
BH
Bill Hawkins
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 4:36 AM
MIC CHECK!
It is time to occupy this thread with something that is time-nutty.
The previous thread on gravity control of a pendulum clock was hijacked
by Jim Palfreyman to a conflict on the metric system, that led to
something completely off topic continuing under the SAME SUBJECT.
Now John Forster seeks to introduce military conflict into this list
with the false drone that the US deliberately let the Iranians have.
Of course we came up with a story to make them believe they did it.
Does that have anything to do with leap seconds? Determining the
speed of neutrinos? Pushing back the limits of accuracy of atomic
time? Using an ancient GPSB program to activate a board found on
eBay? Searching for the perfect divider?
John Ackerman, this list is too large. It needs pruning.
We need more people to occupy this list with stuff that is on topic,
rather than be driven away by people who crave conflict.
Best wishes to all as the solemnity of the solstice approaches.
The solstice, at least, is about real planetary time.
Have at it, while you can.
Bill Hawkins
-----Original Message-----
From: J. Forster
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2011 3:10 PM
To: time-nuts@febo.com; Vintage-Military-RADAR@yahoogroups.com
Cc: armyradios@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
MIC CHECK!
It is time to occupy this thread with something that is time-nutty.
The previous thread on gravity control of a pendulum clock was hijacked
by Jim Palfreyman to a conflict on the metric system, that led to
something completely off topic continuing under the SAME SUBJECT.
Now John Forster seeks to introduce military conflict into this list
with the false drone that the US deliberately let the Iranians have.
Of course we came up with a story to make them believe they did it.
Does that have anything to do with leap seconds? Determining the
speed of neutrinos? Pushing back the limits of accuracy of atomic
time? Using an ancient GPSB program to activate a board found on
eBay? Searching for the perfect divider?
John Ackerman, this list is too large. It needs pruning.
We need more people to occupy this list with stuff that is on topic,
rather than be driven away by people who crave conflict.
Best wishes to all as the solemnity of the solstice approaches.
The solstice, at least, is about real planetary time.
Have at it, while you can.
Bill Hawkins
-----Original Message-----
From: J. Forster
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2011 3:10 PM
To: time-nuts@febo.com; Vintage-Military-RADAR@yahoogroups.com
Cc: armyradios@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
G
gary
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 4:40 AM
Oh I don't know. How about an Alpha Jet.
Few aircrafts can fly as high as this plane, not sure the Iranians have one.
Didier KO4BB
Oh I don't know. How about an Alpha Jet.
> http://www.irandefence.net/gallery/showphoto.php?photo=44&ppuser=9968
The Google boys own one of these too!
On 12/15/2011 6:58 PM, shalimr9@gmail.com wrote:
> Few aircrafts can fly as high as this plane, not sure the Iranians have one.
>
> Didier KO4BB
JF
J. Forster
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 6:24 AM
And what does LightSquared have to do with time-nuttery?
-John
============
MIC CHECK!
It is time to occupy this thread with something that is time-nutty.
The previous thread on gravity control of a pendulum clock was hijacked
by Jim Palfreyman to a conflict on the metric system, that led to
something completely off topic continuing under the SAME SUBJECT.
Now John Forster seeks to introduce military conflict into this list
with the false drone that the US deliberately let the Iranians have.
Of course we came up with a story to make them believe they did it.
Does that have anything to do with leap seconds? Determining the
speed of neutrinos? Pushing back the limits of accuracy of atomic
time? Using an ancient GPSB program to activate a board found on
eBay? Searching for the perfect divider?
John Ackerman, this list is too large. It needs pruning.
We need more people to occupy this list with stuff that is on topic,
rather than be driven away by people who crave conflict.
Best wishes to all as the solemnity of the solstice approaches.
The solstice, at least, is about real planetary time.
Have at it, while you can.
Bill Hawkins
-----Original Message-----
From: J. Forster
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2011 3:10 PM
To: time-nuts@febo.com; Vintage-Military-RADAR@yahoogroups.com
Cc: armyradios@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
drone's systems inside Iran.
time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to
https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.
And what does LightSquared have to do with time-nuttery?
-John
============
> MIC CHECK!
>
> It is time to occupy this thread with something that is time-nutty.
>
> The previous thread on gravity control of a pendulum clock was hijacked
> by Jim Palfreyman to a conflict on the metric system, that led to
> something completely off topic continuing under the SAME SUBJECT.
>
> Now John Forster seeks to introduce military conflict into this list
> with the false drone that the US deliberately let the Iranians have.
> Of course we came up with a story to make them believe they did it.
>
> Does that have anything to do with leap seconds? Determining the
> speed of neutrinos? Pushing back the limits of accuracy of atomic
> time? Using an ancient GPSB program to activate a board found on
> eBay? Searching for the perfect divider?
>
> John Ackerman, this list is too large. It needs pruning.
>
> We need more people to occupy this list with stuff that is on topic,
> rather than be driven away by people who crave conflict.
>
> Best wishes to all as the solemnity of the solstice approaches.
> The solstice, at least, is about real planetary time.
>
> Have at it, while you can.
>
> Bill Hawkins
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: J. Forster
> Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2011 3:10 PM
> To: time-nuts@febo.com; Vintage-Military-RADAR@yahoogroups.com
> Cc: armyradios@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [time-nuts] "The GPS navigation is the weakest point,"
>
> Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science
> Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy
> territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan
> Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside
> hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the
> US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured
> drone's systems inside Iran.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
> To unsubscribe, go to
> https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
> and follow the instructions there.
>
>
DJ
David J Taylor
Fri, Dec 16, 2011 9:26 AM
And what does LightSquared have to do with time-nuttery?
-John
> And what does LightSquared have to do with time-nuttery?
>
> -John
Obvious - it may break your reception of the GPS time reference.
David
--
SatSignal software - quality software written to your requirements
Web: http://www.satsignal.eu
Email: david-taylor@blueyonder.co.uk
